If you bought the buzz on Hillary Clinton’s major foreign-policy speech at the Council on Foreign Relations last week, she was trying to regain her waning clout in the Obama administration.

But the media’s focus on Clinton’s level of job satisfaction distracted attention from the meat of her speech, which laid out the administration’s foreign-policy doctrine: using every means to persuade other countries (and civil societies) to cooperate on issues that concern us most.

Clinton looked great in a deep-blue suit and talked forcefully. Her recently broken elbow, which kept her from joining Obama on his Moscow trip, was out of its cast. And no one asked her about the now famous Daily Beast column in which Tina Brown said: “It’s time for Barack Obama to let Hillary Clinton take off her burqa.”

Indeed, Clinton seemed comfortable in the role of team player in an administration where President Obama sets the foreign-policy tone. “Our approach to foreign policy must reflect the world as it is, not as it used to be,” she said — a dig at the phraseology of Donald Rumsfeld. She consigned to history’s dustbin the following strategies: the 19th-century concert of great powers, the 20th-century U.S.-Soviet balance of power, Cold War containment, and the unilateral exercise of U.S. power.

Instead, she said, the United States will attempt to strengthen old alliances in Europe and Asia, and it will encourage new global powers, such as China, India, Russia, Brazil and Turkey, to work together on shared problems. These include non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism, economic growth, and climate change.

“We will lead by inducing greater cooperation,” Clinton said, and by promoting “a multi-partner world.”

If this sounds jargony to you, I sympathize. Many of the ideas in the speech come from academia, such as the “smart power” concept of Harvard professor Joe Nye. He argues that America needs to make the best use of all available tools — economic, diplomatic, innovative, etc. — in our foreign policy. (Nye held senior posts in Bill Clinton’s administration and was Hillary’s pick for ambassador to Japan; the Obama White House chose someone else.)

Another source of ideas was Anne-Marie Slaughter, a former dean at Princeton University and now director of policy planning at the State Department. She has written a book, A New World Order, on the importance of global networks to foreign policy.

But it’s not the jargon in Clinton’s speech that worries me. Nor do I question the wisdom of seeking more cooperation in a world where many of the most pressing threats cut across borders, and where the United States can no longer afford to go it alone.

What disturbs me is that Obama and Clinton may nourish inflated hopes about the degree of cooperation they can elicit from other countries. In his first six months on the job, Obama has done a fine job of tamping down anti-U.S. feelings abroad. But warm feelings won’t necessarily translate into joint action on the ground.

A couple of cases in point: On Iran, a key reason Obama has been pursuing talks, despite the current internal crisis, is to court world opinion. Should good-faith diplomacy fail to halt Tehran’s suspect nuclear activities, other nations will be more likely to join in a policy of much tougher sanctions against Iran.

Similarly, Obama sought a new nuclear accord with Russia partly to woo Moscow and other states into joining our efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

However, Moscow, which is selling Iran a nuclear reactor, has shown no indication that it is willing to get tougher with Tehran. Nor is it clear whether key European countries are willing to jeopardize lucrative business interests in Iran. Meantime, despite North Korea’s nuclear naughtiness, China has not substantially toughened its approach to Pyongyang.

This doesn’t mean Obama shouldn’t use his global popularity to push for greater cooperation on key issues. But achieving such cooperation will be tough, even with putative allies (as Clinton found in India when she raised global-warming issues). Global partners may balk or demand more concessions than the president is willing to make. And other countries won’t necessarily view global threats the way we do.

A “multi-partner world” may be desirable, but it’s not inevitable, and it won’t be a panacea. The term may suffice as a concept, but as a policy framework, it falls short.