It’s too bad Gen. David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker have to schlepp all the way from Baghdad this week to brief Congress.

We all know that their testimony will add little and change little.

President Bush won’t shift course before his term ends. Troops will draw down some, but not below pre-surge levels, and our military will remain overextended. The possibility of shaping a different Iraq policy won’t emerge until a new president is elected.

Meantime, the realities on the ground were laid bare over the past two weeks by the fighting in Basra: Iraq’s security situation is better than its darkest days, but remains fragile. The hope has dimmed that improved security would enable Iraqi factions to reconcile, and the Iraqi army is far from ready for prime time.

Most important: The Basra affair illustrated that Iran now holds the key to stability in Iraq.

Petraeus and Crocker did not expect that their testimony would be preceded by the debacle in Basra. As I wrote last week, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki initiated a major Iraqi military operation without prior consultation with the Americans. This has now been publicly confirmed by Crocker and other top administration officials.

There had long been talk that al-Maliki needed to restore order to Basra, a critical oil port where Shiite militias were fighting for turf and control of oil. The Americans expected that the Iraqi premier would at some point mount a well-planned effort to curb Iran-backed militias like the Mahdi army of the radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

Instead, al-Maliki – perhaps smarting from U.S. sniping at his incompetence – gave the Americans hardly any notice before embarking on a disorganized military venture. His Iraqi forces weren’t capable of ousting the militias; more than 1,000 of his troops reportedly deserted, including top commanders; U.S. forces and airpower had to come to the rescue.

A Baghdad cease-fire by al-Sadr that U.S. commanders consider crucial to post-surge security gains came close to breaking.

But most galling to U.S. officials was this: When the going got tough, top Iraqi Shiite officials rushed to the holy city of Qom in Iran to get help mediating a Basra cease-fire with al-Sadr. And whom in Iran did they ask for help? As first reported by McClatchy News Service’s intrepid Baghdad bureau chief Leila Fadel, it was none other than Brig. Gen. Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Brigade of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is the group U.S. commanders accuse of training and arming radical militias.

In other words, Iraq’s leaders had to turn to an Iranian we label a “terrorist” to get al-Maliki and his American backers out of a jam. The commander of the Quds Brigade apparently told al-Sadr to cool off.

Against this background, Petraeus and Crocker will tell Congress that more time is needed for Iraqi forces and political reconciliation efforts to jell.

They will also say that a speedy pullout would lead to political collapse and a renewal of all-out fighting – not just Sunnis versus Shiites, but fighting within sects. I think they are right about the consequences of a swift withdrawal. Basra is the perfect example. When the Brits pulled out of Basra, the place collapsed as Shiite gangs warred for turf.

We don’t know whether a large U.S. troop presence can produce long-awaited political reconciliation or a functional Iraqi government. Iraqis will have 10 more months to work on this conundrum before the next U.S. administration takes office. Within that time there will be provincial elections, and al-Maliki might even be dumped by Iraqi legislators.

We do know – as the Basra affair showed – that Iran is crucial to any Iraq solution.

Iranian officials are clearly awaiting the next American leader. I was told as much by the Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki at the Davos World Economic Forum. The United States and Iran have common interests in avoiding total chaos in Iraq (although the Iranians will continue to stir the pot, so long as they suspect Iraq is a base for U.S. efforts at regime change in Tehran).

The next White House occupant, unburdened by the rhetoric of “axis of evil,” can explore whether broad talks without preconditions might enable Washington and Tehran to explore greater Iraq cooperation, which in turn would facilitate a U.S. drawdown. Even John McCain will have to consider such newthink if he wants to prevent a U.S. military meltdown.

The Petraeus-Crocker hearings may feed the election media cycle, but they will have little impact on the Iraq policy that will matter – the policy that will be put forward after February 2009.