Dictator Kim Jong-Il’s birthday, celebrated in typical grand fashion last week, dominated public attention in North Korea. In the rest of the world, though, an entirely different North Korean issue occupied center stage: the supposed landmark nuclear-disarmament accord that Pyongyang had reached in multinational talks.

The relative absence of discussion about that agreement within North Korea’s borders underscored the great divide between that country and the outside world and contributed to doubts about Pyongyang’s intentions.

Now, as was the case in the early 1990s, when North Korea made similar nuclear promises, the question is the same: Will it live up to its commitments?

Although I firmly believe in the possibilities of diplomacy, my sentiments drift toward those who harbor reservations. North Korea is and has been a failing state. Pyongyang cannot seem to take care of any of its needs, except military ones in an exaggerated fashion, which also renders the country dangerously unstable. Thus, its leaders should be expected to say just about anything to draw assistance, as would happen under the new accord, with various countries providing fuel oil and other incentives.

North Korea also offers an abysmal track record. When former President Bill Clinton decided to negotiate with Pyongyang and accept its word not to develop nuclear weapons in return for help with its energy problems, I pored as carefully as one could through open sources and eventually applauded. Ignoring the skeptics, I believed that Clinton had adopted a prudent course – especially in light of the alternative, a potential conflict with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear war had hovered over my entire life to that point. As a child, ducking and covering in elementary-school drills during tensions with the Soviet Union, my awareness of how close the United States came to a nuclear conflict was nil. Similarly, in the midst of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when the superpowers again edged too near nuclear confrontation, the true danger barely registered in my adolescent mind. But in 1994, I was in a position to grasp the seriousness of the situation and urge constructive steps.

Unfortunately, I was wrong; North Korea opted to ignore its promises and today boasts nuclear weapons in its arsenal.

Against that backdrop, the latest nuclear discussion would appear to fall into the fool-me-once, shame-on-you, fool-me-twice, shame-on-me category. The new accord looks, sounds, smells and walks a lot like the Clinton-North Korean deal. Are we revisiting history?

Or is the 2007 agreement truly better, as the Bush administration insists?

I have always liked former President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, “Trust, but verify.” The White House asserts that the new accord is stronger because it holds North Korea to short-term benchmarks and also has the backing of China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. China, which wields the only substantial influence over North Korea, in particular could make a difference. Another appealing aspect of the accord is its fast-track approach to dismantling Pyongyang’s threatening nuclear assets.

Even so, the timing of this deal – which happened after North Korea recently detonated a nuclear device – is curious. It almost makes one wonder if the North Koreans had it right, that demonstrating their nuclear-weapons prowess would bolster their position.

At this juncture, I cannot endorse the new accord. But I will leave my mind open. As North Korea’s compliance is verified, my sense of trust could return. I would be quite satisfied to be proven wrong about my initial impulse.