As I listened to a group of specialists on weapons of mass destruction at a recent public forum, I could not avoid a pessimistic shiver. To a person, they sounded less than optimistic about the future.

It certainly is easy to understand why. After all, more nations than ever possess nuclear weapons. Access to chemical and biological devices has expanded, with terrorists especially eager to obtain them. Such weapons, particularly if used in combination with one another, could terrify, devastate and – in the worst-case scenario – obliterate the United States.

I have long had greater concerns about biological weapons than chemical ones, and have engaged in an ongoing public discussion via this column with federal officials on the need to bolster U.S. capabilities against smallpox, anthrax and other agents. It simply makes sense to erect barriers where possible through the use of mandatory vaccines and the distribution of appropriate medicines, thereby removing certain biological options from the list of miscreants’ options. Some progress has occurred but far less than what this nation requires.

What about nuclear weapons?

As former senior U.S. arms-control negotiator Jack Mendelsohn aptly noted at the forum, there are international prohibitions on the use of chemical and biological weapons – but not nuclear ones. It is more than a bit ironic that the devices that could wreak the most damage have not inspired humankind to ban their use.

Meanwhile, nuclear-nonproliferation efforts, while succeeding in some respects, have not prevented the nuclear-armed camp from increasing its ranks by about 50 percent in the past decade. It particularly disturbs me that all of those developments have happened in the Asia-Pacific region, which so many people had looked to for global leadership and development in the 21st century.

The prospects of a conflict involving nuclear weapons in Asia may appear too frightening to consider, but they are as tangible as the region’s economic prowess. An India-Pakistan scenario readily comes to mind. So does one involving North Korea that could precipitate a series of reactions – including a push for nuclear weapons by Japan. Nuclear weapons also shadow the China-Taiwan dispute, and some Chinese officials, though subsequently repudiated, have openly discussed the possibility of using that country’s nuclear weapons against the United States in a conflict.

Of those situations, the Korean imbroglio deserves the most attention at present. North Korea, an embattled, suspicious, destitute, essentially isolated state with meager capabilities – except in the military realm – presents a natural nightmare scenario.

Three times since World War II, the United States has found itself drawn into tensions that could have resulted in the use of nuclear weapons. Two – the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war – happened during the Cold War. The third, which focused on North Korea and its nuclear program in 1994, was a new-world-order issue.

Former President Bill Clinton has received a lot of flak for believing in an arrangement with Pyongyang aimed at stopping that country’s reach for nuclear weapons. Although Clinton’s bid failed, it was the right decision for its time. And President George W. Bush, despite his early brushing of North Korea with the “axis of evil” label, has shown similar good sense by emphasizing negotiation.

For the record, I do not blindly trust the North Koreans, but I believe that they would prefer accommodation to military confrontation. Therefore, I side with Chung Dong-young, South Korea’s unification minister, who recently urged more active engagement by the United States to build trust with North Korea and facilitate its movement into the international community. Is the Bush administration game?

Perhaps. Christopher Hill, the main U.S. negotiator on the North Korean nuclear matter, reportedly is planning a trip to Pyongyang. Hill steadily has nudged North Korea toward giving up its nuclear-weapons program and re-embracing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Similar to the original Clinton deal, the quid pro quo in this case would be for North Korea to receive energy assistance and security guarantees.

Chung also is correct in asserting that engagement – not containment – has worked effectively in other Asian countries, including China and Vietnam.

What might Hill offer and secure in Pyongyang? Could the six-party talks that have yielded some progress on the North Korean nuclear program deliver even more when they resume next month? Might the Cold War finally end on the Korean peninsula? Is lasting peace possible? Is it realistic to think of reunification of the Koreas?

Americans, Koreans and their negotiating partners owe it to themselves to explore the possibilities.

The alternative would take them to a deadly, dangerous place that would inspire only pessimism.