The United States seems always beset with some money-draining project like the infamous Big Dig in Boston. That’s a traffic improvement project in the downtown area that was supposed to solve thousands of problems for drivers. At last count, its cost had topped an astronomical $14 billion, and, though open, the project continues to have difficulties with water leakage and insulation droppage. The cost rises by the hour.

There is overwhelming evidence of inefficiency, fraud, under-the-table payoffs and shoddy workmanship by outfits that never should have been hired in the first place.

The Big Dig has been in the news for several years now for the fiasco it has become, and when you think about it, there always seems to be some building project using public funds that should win the legendary Golden Fleece Award.

With all this background, why in the world would the United States ever believe it could run an effective program of rebuilding in a treacherous and strife-torn region such as Iraq? At least in America, the boondoggling project people didn’t have terrorists breathing down their necks trying to disrupt everything. The only terror in our work is how the public gets slaughtered financially.

The Seattle Times touched on the Iraq fiasco recently by declaring: “The generosity and goodwill of American taxpayers to rebuild Iraq are grossly abused by a lack of accountability for the $18.4 billion reconstruction effort.” That’s inexcusable!

The Times backs up that statement by pointing out that audits released last week by the special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction along with troubling press accounts, especially by T. Christian Miller of the Los Angeles Times, paint a depressing picture of waste, fraud and incompetence. In one region alone, South Central Iraq, reconstruction managers cannot account for $96.6 million of the $119.9 million sent for the work.

Huge amounts of money that made it to Iraq either disappeared without credible accounting or were wasted on infrastructure investments that eventually hit a brick wall because of improper operation and maintenance. In one instance, a new water plant was built without any new water lines. There was absolutely no way to get the water into Iraqi homes and businesses. Some audits suggest that a big problem is the heavy emphasis on U.S. firms over Iraqi companies in the initial awarding of fat contracts.

Could it be that some of the outfits that figured in the Boston Big Dig debacle found a way to dip their fingers into the huge pie of “Iraqi reconstruction”?

Concludes the Seattle Times: “U.S. taxpayers cannot be faulted for wondering about the Iraqi oil money that was blithely predicted to pay the cost of rebuilding. The Bush administration needs to talk candidly with the American people about monumental waste and fraud.”

When $96.6 million of $119.9 million sent for one Iraq job cannot be accounted for, it’s time somebody of authority looks into the cash drawer and finds out why — and then takes forceful steps to prevent such madness from reoccurring.