I stand as appalled as anyone about the Iraqi prisoner-abuse scandal, and hope my original fear — that the atrocities could serve as a catalyst for a relentless rising tide of opposition to the United States, undermining the intervention in Iraq and American interests elsewhere — will not come to pass.

At the same time, I would have no patience for an extended period of national self-flagellation over the matter. Nor would I support a massive marketing effort, as some recommend, aiming to persuade critics that the United States indeed clings solidly to the moral ground that the graphic photos and other evidence of prisoner abuse have eroded.

Meaningful actions would speak far louder than apologies and promises, especially those that would advance the goal of bringing to Iraq and other trouble spots the outcomes that both Americans and the majority of people in those areas desire.

To minimize the agony, the full details of what happened under America’s watch behind the walls of Iraqi prisons must come to light. Those judged guilty of inappropriate and unacceptable behavior — perpetrators, facilitators and enablers — deserve severe punishment, at least equaling what civilians convicted of similar practices would receive. To avoid a repeat of the abuses, the command and staff changes to which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld alluded in his testimony last week must happen quickly.

Some commentators seek Rumsfeld’s head as part of the solution, and he has said clearly that he would resign if he could no longer effectively handle his job. At the moment, however, the investigation points to more questions than answers, and a compelling case to dismiss the defense secretary has not materialized.

Moreover, a switch at the helm of the Department of Defense would not diminish the mounting challenges, complexities, costs or casualties in Iraq. Senators who quizzed Rumsfeld on Friday about “unexpected” developments in Iraq simply had closed their eyes to reality. There is nothing — absolutely nothing — that is surprising about the current phase of the intervention. It was effortlessly predictable. And the difficulties will surely multiply before they begin to diminish.

Unfortunately, Iraqis now have more concerns than ever about U.S. intentions and commitments to democracy-building, economic development and other pressing matters.

And an increasing percentage of Americans, as underscored by a recent Gallup Poll, expresses dissatisfaction about the three issues most critical to this fall’s U.S. presidential election — the handling of the intervention in Iraq, the waging of the war against terrorism and the stewardship of the economy.

To change those perceptions, the United States must modify its strategy in Iraq and related areas.

During the short term, more dollars and troops must flow to Iraq. Those steps would permit the United States to impose greater control while promoting sensible plans, such as transferring a measure of authority to the Iraqi people.

During the long term, the United States faces the unenviable task of securing more partners, just as global reluctance over joining the morass in Iraq soars. Discussions at the United Nations, although helpful, fall far short of a consensus and lack a sense of urgency. Perhaps if the United States placed more stress on Iraq as a key to peace and stability in the Middle East than on that country’s role in the war against terrorism, other nations might respond with greater enthusiasm.

I have always believed that reprising the 1991 Madrid conference — with the original hosts, former President George Bush and former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, in supporting roles — would help rekindle the nearly defunct Middle East peace process. It still could, especially if the organizers added Iraq prominently to the agenda.

That effort would cast the Iraq conundrum into a regional context and, just as important, give Russia and other key players in Europe and the Middle East a convenient way to broaden their involvement.

But if Americans waste too much time writhing in self-criticism over the prison-abuse scandal, they will merely contribute to the intervention’s flagging momentum, expand the ranks of naysayers and encourage the terrorists and other miscreants who long for America’s failure in Iraq and the broader Middle East.

– John C. Bersia, who won a Pulitzer Prize in editorial writing for the Orlando Sentinel in 2000, is also the special assistant to the president for global perspectives and a professor at the University of Central Florida.