Stung by reality, the White House has finally recognized it has an Iraq problem.

The postwar bill is soaring, the military is stretched thin, and Iraqi security is going south. This month, the White House will ask a dazed Congress for an additional $87 billion — and that’s probably a lowball. The 2004 election looms.

So the administration is looking for cover. Colin Powell has been dispatched to the United Nations to beg bemused allies to save America’s bacon.

This is not the way to rescue Iraq.

I say this not because the United Nations can’t offer Iraq useful political and economic assistance. It can. But, even if the White House were willing to share political and economic control in Iraq — and so far it isn’t — member states won’t offer enough troops or funds to make a real difference.

The amount of money needed is too large, and the situation in much of Iraq too dangerous, for foreign peacekeepers to handle. Iraqis themselves, moreover, may reject troops from many of the potential donors.

“The United States is turning to the United Nations option out of desperation, not out of a plan,” says Laith Kubba, a longtime Iraqi opposition activist and expert on struggles for democracy in Arab nations. “It is a search for quick fixes, and they don’t exist.”

I think Kubba has touched on the heart of the matter. The administration never had a clear plan for postwar Iraq (as the joint chiefs of staff confirmed in a recent, leaked report). The White House still hasn’t produced one.

Without an integrated U.S. plan that sets out attainable goals and a timeline for turning over power to Iraqis, the situation inside that country is only going to get worse.

What would such a plan entail?

For starters, focus on handing over power to Iraqis as soon as possible. But be realistic about what this means.

Before the war, key administration Iraq hawks nourished the illusion that Iraqi exile Ahmad Chalabi could return like Charles de Gaulle and take over the country. Chalabi, a talented but controversial figure with a financial scandal in his past, is part of Iraq’s interim government. But he has no substantial popular base inside Iraq, nor could he survive as a U.S.-installed leader. And many questioned the accuracy of information he has funneled to the administration.

Chalabi still has important champions stateside. Princeton historian Bernard Lewis, an intellectual guru to top Bush officials, advised last week in the Wall Street Journal, that the United States somehow put Chalabi in power without benefit of election. Such ill-informed ideas should play no part in administration thinking.

Instead of playing favorites, the administration should strengthen the Iraqi Governing Council and give it the resources to succeed. It needs a budget, it needs staff. It needs a national security force that it controls, made up of Iraqis. This means drawing on the disbanded Iraqi army, as the Pentagon belatedly realizes.

Nothing would help the council more than for Iraqis to see an improvement in their lives. Such improvement is possible if Washington provides the resources. This is not the moment to wait to see what contributions will be coughed up by U.N. members.

For heavens sake, spend the money and send in thousands of generators so Iraqis can turn on the lights. Give the Governing Council enough funds to set up a credible media network, so that Iraqi TV-watchers can watch something other than Al-Jazeera’s anti-American diatribes. Let the council spend the money where it will do the most good, rather than having their hands tied by no-bid contracts given to big Republican donors with White House connections.

Then help the council to get a credible political process going that leads to the writing of a constitution and national elections within a year. “You must have a political process that people believe in,” says Kubba, suggesting that leaders in Iraq’s 18 provinces be drawn in. Local elections could be a prelude to a national ballot.

Here’s where the United Nations could help, in preparing for and supervising the electoral process. This would convince the world that the ballot not a manipulated.

If Iraqis knew where they were headed — and if the Bush administration had a timeline for turning over power — the unrest that threatens the country might be contained. But this requires a commitment to an election outcome that can’t be guaranteed. Iraqis have no experience of democracy, and the government they elect may bear little resemblance to Bush’s promises of a model Mideast democracy. But the time for occupation is running out, and elections can’t wait.

The Bush team must choose: Stay on in Iraq and install a puppet regime, or move toward imperfect elections in a year’s time backed with a massive infusion of funds.

Quick fixes there are not.