Washington ? It is easy to get lost in the details and the bureaucratic drama of the Bush administration’s second abrupt shift in its Iraq policy. Stay focused instead on the unannounced big changes that can help guide U.S. forces out of their exposed position as the beleaguered occupiers of Iraq.

These tectonic political shifts underlay the procedural changes announced in Baghdad and Washington over the weekend. They give the administration a framework for transforming the increasingly controversial occupation force into a sustainable, stabilizing U.S. presence that, of necessity, shares real power and responsibility with Iraqi politicians, soldiers and intelligence services.

By agreeing to hand over sovereignty to a provisional executive and legislature on July 1, 2004, and let Iraqis organize democratic national elections thereafter, the White House seems finally to have accepted the wisdom of the political adage that you can’t beat somebody with nobody.

The clear and realistic path to sovereignty will finally make the 24-member Iraqi Governing Council into “somebody” by giving it significant responsibilities in the fight against the guerrilla remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime and in designing Iraq’s future constitution. Mounting casualties and growing political tensions in Iraq forced Washington to overcome its wariness of taking this admittedly big gamble.

This suggests that the administration’s military and civilian leaders are learning from mistakes in Iraq and adjusting to changing circumstances. Nothing could be more welcome, even if the administration predictably minimizes in public its need or willingness to change policy as it combats a nasty insurgency.

The administration has, in fact, been conducting a quiet but sharpening internal debate about the way forward in Iraq that culminated in the sudden round trip between Washington and Baghdad last week by U.S. administrator

L. Paul Bremer. That trip produced the unusual result of Bremer taking the lead in scaling back his own dominant role in Baghdad.

Two weeks earlier, the Pentagon had sent Bremer a memo that gingerly questioned details and the timing of his seven-point plan for Iraq’s transition to independence. Bremer’s bristling three-page response was immediate and unyielding. But by the time Bremer arrived in Washington, he showed much more flexibility and a readiness to change.

In historical terms, Bremer seems to have recognized a need to turn from the occupation style of Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan to that of John J. McCloy in Germany.

The historical analogies offered by the administration for Iraq have tended to lump those two post-World War II occupation experiences together, instead of recognizing their significant differences. This is one mistake that is being corrected.

MacArthur commanded occupied Japan as if it were an army and had his staff write that country’s postwar constitution. McCloy emphasized consensual politics and helped clear the way for Konrad Adenauer and others to assume power. Catapulted into the chaotic conditions of Baghdad in June to replace the more relaxed Jay Garner, Bremer felt he had to play MacArthur for a time. But McCloy is closer to the mark now.

Bremer will now guide the Governing Council in writing a basic set of laws that will serve as the country’s interim constitution from next July 1, rather than writing that document for them. The basic laws will necessarily touch on and point to solutions to the thorny problems of federalism, minority rights and the connection of religion and politics in the future Iraq.

The changes announced last Saturday in Baghdad will also open the way for substantive negotiations between the council and U.S. authorities about a status of forces agreement for the stationing of American and other foreign troops, perhaps as part of a defense treaty.

These and other steps toward genuine self-government will help break what U.S. officials call the “Sistani logjam.” By saying he would not accept any Iraqi constitution written before a return of sovereignty and political control to Iraqis, the influential Shiite Ayatollah Ali Sistani had in effect doomed Bremer’s seven-point plan months ago. Sistani has reportedly signaled U.S. officials that the new plan has his blessing, although he has made no public statement.

None of this is likely to make any difference to the gunmen and bombers who are attacking the very hope of stability in Iraq. They still must be defeated on the ground. But these changes improve the chances that coalition forces and newly empowered Iraqis can do just that.

Jim Hoagland is a columnist for Washington Post Writers Group.