Baghdad ? Right now, the Iraqi political process is more important to Americans than the U.S. political process.

Why so? Because 150,000 U.S. troops can’t come home until Iraq is secure, and Iraq won’t be secure until it has a new government.

President Bush pledged that Iraq will get a democracy, and — lacking any discovery of weapons of mass destruction — much of the world will judge America’s war by whether Bush delivers. But now that U.S. officials are running Iraq, the problems with that pledge have become abundantly clear.

In a state devastated by one-man rule, it isn’t easy to find new and credible leaders. It will take at least a year to organize national elections in a country divided by geography and ethnicity and religion. In the meantime, American occupation authorities badly need an Iraqi governing partner — now.

Iraqis don’t know who’s in charge, or how to access the Americans, and this breeds dangerous resentments. Bewildered Iraqis approach U.S. soldiers on the streets to ask how to get jobs or evict armed squatters who have seized their apartments. Protesters of all sorts — from white-turbaned clerics to disgruntled army officers — march to journalists’ hotels because there is no government to take their complaints.

Occupation radio broadcasts some information, in martial voice, telling Iraqi children where to take exams, or mothers how to treat childhood diarrhea. But Iraqis need some sort of Iraqi address to help them through this transition phase.

Finding that Iraqi partner has proved much harder than the administration expected. Two scenarios have already failed. The newest has serious flaws.

First came the Chalabi plan. Key Pentagon officials hoped that exiled opposition leader Ahmad Chalabi would sweep back into Iraq like de Gaulle returning to France. Pentagon officials airlifted Chalabi into the country and helped him set up shop in Baghdad in a two-story mansion topped with a Chinese pagoda that once belonged to a high secret police official.

Sheikhs in flowing robes and turbaned religious leaders still flock to the mansion in hopes of winning America’s favor. But when I ask Iraqis about Chalabi, most either look blank or call him a crook, or say he is America’s man. He doesn’t appear to have the base to become a national leader — at least not now.

Then came the G-7 plan.

Chalabi is one of the “Group of Seven,” Iraqi political figures who had the White House’s blessing until mid-May to convene a national political conference that would pick an interim government and start drafting a new constitution. Before the war, the then-Group of Five led the best known Iraqi opposition groups, mostly in exile. This odd mix included two top Kurdish leaders, a former Baathist backed by the CIA, and the Shiite Ayatollah Mohammed Bakr al Hakim (who just returned from Iran). After the war, the G-5 added a prominent Sunni lawyer and another religious Shiite group.

But it has become clear that the G-7 isn’t inclusive enough to represent this complex country, where many people resent the exiles. Hakim, whose followers are taking over Baghdad neighborhoods and harassing women who don’t veil, can’t speak for all Shiites. Some G-7 members wanted to expand their group — and the list of conference invitees — but the Shiite returnees didn’t want to dilute their power.

The G-7’s failure to broaden its base helped convince Paul Bremer, the administration’s civilian viceroy in Baghdad, to nix the national conference. Chalabi et al. say they may confront the Americans, but Bremer has President Bush’s backing.

So now we have the Bremer Plan. Bremer wants an interim authority soon and will appoint a 25-30 person Iraqi political council. He also will set up a convention to draft a new constitution, after consulting a broad range of Iraqis on who should be named to those two bodies. Delegations of women, or tribal sheikhs or lawyers, can be seen traipsing into the presidential palace to meet Bremer, a Kennedyesque diplomat with thick wavy hair; he wears navy suits and pinstriped shirts in 100-degree heat.

But the real issue is whether Bremer can create a credible Iraqi partner by fiat. He is gambling that most Iraqis care more about the return of security and jobs than politics — at least in the short run — and will tolerate a weak interim authority if he delivers.

If he is right, his plan will provide him a one-year window for rebuilding Iraqi institutions and preparing for elections. But an appointed political council will lack legitimacy in many Iraqis’ eyes.

If the council is discredited or too weak, blame for everything that goes wrong will be laid on the Americans. As lights go on and conditions improve, Iraqis will start agitating for their own government with the power to control Iraqi oil money and end occupation.

Navigating Iraqi politics will be a lot tougher than navigating Capitol Hill.