Orlando, Fla. ? NASA was repeatedly warned for years by safety panels and government auditors that extensive job cuts put the shuttle program at risk and was told just three days before the Columbia disaster that its work force was understaffed and under stress.

Critics have long worried that the space agency has risked human lives by cutting too deeply, although there is no indication that the manpower problem contributed directly to the loss of the shuttle and its seven-member crew.

Since 1993, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration has sliced nearly 7,000 jobs, including oversight and other shuttle-related positions at Kennedy Space Center.

As far back as 1996, an independent panel of experts predicted that continuing budget cuts could threaten shuttle safety. The report by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel singled out Kennedy Space Center as the NASA center that would have the toughest time maintaining shuttle safety while cutting workers.

“KSC faces a management challenge of major dimensions if it is to maintain a work force of sufficient size, skills and experience to achieve acceptable levels of safety,” the report said.

In 2000, the space agency was slammed with three major reports critical of its work force troubles.

“The large reduction in NASA quality assurance inspectors for each shuttle is very disturbing,” said one independent panel chaired by one of NASA’s own: Henry McDonald, former director of Ames Research Center.

Understaffing, stress

A report by the advisory panel found that as a result of a shortage of experienced workers, new hires were given tasks for which they weren’t qualified. Training was found to be inadequate. Many shuttle employees were unable to take vacation time or attend training classes because of overwhelming workloads. Stress-related illnesses had been skyrocketing. And processing problems that could endanger the shuttle were increasingly going undetected.

The third report, from the U.S. General Accounting Office, expressed worries that understaffing and a stressful work environment could jeopardize the shuttle’s safety.

“The shuttle program has identified many key areas that are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers, and the remaining work force shows signs of overwork and fatigue,” the report said.

NASA maintains that staffing cuts never jeopardized shuttle safety and that the reductions were made to eliminate redundant duties.

Still, NASA attempted to stem the downward spiral by adding jobs in 2000 for the first time in almost a decade. Hundreds of new shuttle workers were hired throughout the agency, including 25 new Kennedy Space Center inspectors.

“We’ve done everything possible to look at it and shore up the weaknesses,” NASA shuttle program manager Ron Dittemore told the Orlando Sentinel in September 2000.

‘Brain drain’

But the problems won’t be solved immediately.

The years of cutbacks have created a so-called “brain drain.”

As the aging work force approaches retirement, NASA has been left scrambling to attract and keep young talent. The average age at NASA is 45. Among those in the agency’s crucial science and engineering fields, the ranks of employees older than 60 outnumber those younger than 30 almost 3 to 1. Roughly a quarter of workers are eligible to retire within the next five years.

In its January report this year, the auditors said that even with some recent gains, work force shortages could likely worsen, new staffers will require considerable training and work stress remains high.

It’s a story well-known to NASA.

Work force reduction has been endemic at NASA for years. Cutting jobs has been the answer to demands that the space program reduce costs. But questions about how those cuts have affected shuttle safety have grown more numerous in recent years.

Funding cuts

In its glory days, NASA ran on a blank check. It filled its plate with ambitious projects that were not only expensive to begin with but grew more costly over time. But by the early 1990s, the perception that NASA was wasting some of its money began to grow.

A Congressional investigation in 1992 revealed the agency had spent $30 million on a space shuttle toilet that was supposed to have cost only $2.9 million.

NASA’s optimism collided headfirst with the federal budget deficit, and something had to give.

A decision was made to steer day-to-day management of the shuttle program to a private contractor while the space agency retained oversight and broad authority over launch decisions.

United Space Alliance stepped up to the plate — a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin Corp. The private contractor arrangement was designed to save money and trim jobs.

Both goals were accomplished.

NASA has saved nearly $100 million on every space shuttle flight, according to Howard McCurdy, professor of public administration at American University and author of six books about the space program.

Yet concerns over whether that savings has cost human lives could become a focus of Columbia’s investigation.

“I think there is a widespread perception in Washington that NASA has been underfunded,” said Loren Thompson, an aerospace analyst and chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, a public-policy think tank in Virginia. “There’s also a feeling that in some indirect way, it has contributed to the problems with the shuttle fleet.”