Washington ? Something strange and important has happened to the system of picking presidential candidates. Influence that was supposed to move from political insiders to the broad public has been captured by activists, pollsters, pundits and fund-raisers — not exactly the people the reformers had in mind. The new system removes the useful peer-group screening that once operated but fails in its promise to give power to the people.

You can see the process at work in the widespread expectation that Howard Dean will capture the Democratic nomination — even though not one vote has been cast in any contest and millions of Democrats across the country have no idea who Dean — or any of his eight rivals — is.

This is not peculiar to Dean or the Democrats. Four years ago, expectations were equally strong that the Republican candidate would be George W. Bush — even though he had been in elective office for barely five years.

Political scientists say that the whole “drama” of the primaries is a fraud — that the opposition party almost invariably nominates the candidate who raises the most money in the pre-election year and leads the field in the final polls of the year.

Of course, there can be bumps along the way. John McCain slowed Bush’s coronation by beating him in New Hampshire and Dick Gephardt might do the same thing to Dean in Iowa this cycle. But the expectations for Bush were so high that credentialed candidates such as former Vice President Dan Quayle and former Cabinet members Elizabeth Dole and Lamar Alexander dropped out before the voting began. And McCain was unable to sustain the challenge, despite his obvious appeal.

Many Democratic consultants — including some lukewarm toward Dean — argue that the party “cannot afford” to deny Dean the nomination because the former Vermont governor has staked such a strong claim to the prize. What Bush did four years ago with his name and family connections, his wealth of fund-raising friends and his early support from his fellow governors, Dean has done with his Internet prowess and his mobilization of a highly educated elite fervently opposed to Bush and the Iraq War.

Even if Dean stumbles, pundits say, his “momentum” will carry him through.

But “momentum” is a myth. Last August, at the American Political Science Assn. convention in Philadelphia, William Mayer of Northeastern University said that his study of 10 contested nominations in both parties from 1980 onward showed that finishing first or second in the Iowa caucuses did nothing to improve the statistical chances of winning. A first or second in New Hampshire was more of a boost, but the best predictor by far — right nine out of 10 times — was the identity of the top fund-raiser and top poll-sitter of the pre-presidential year.

Prior to 1972, presidential nominations were awarded by the politicians in both parties — officeholders, state and local organization leaders. They watched the few primaries then held, but made their own judgments about the talent and electability of the aspirants. But the Democratic Party rebelled after the tumultuous 1968 convention turned away from the surviving anti-Vietnam War candidates and nominated Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

The Democrats wrote new rules designed to give control to grass-roots party members. Those rules proved so complex that states decided the only way to comply was to hold primaries. The Republicans were dragged along in this populist revolution, whose rationale was that the people would rule.

Problem is, not all primaries are equal; those early in the year have far more influence than those that come later. And as states competed to be at the head of the line, the calendar of contests was advanced to the point that this year, Democrats expect to finish their work by the first or second week in March — just when it used to begin.

Most Americans have a limited appetite for politics. When the candidates are forced to do most of their campaigning for the nomination in the pre-presidential year, they quickly find that the only attentive audience members are activists, donors, pollsters and the political reporters. Those four groups — none of them remotely representative of the grass-roots — have acquired the power to say who is “expected” to win — and who usually does win.

If polling and punditry were less eager to anoint, every poll would provide the option of answering, “I don’t think I know enough yet to make a choice among these candidates.” That answer would top every national poll.

This rush to judgment devalues the role of the party leaders and elected officials and still fails to achieve the reformers’ populist goals. It comes close to being the worst way possible to pick a president.

David Broder is a columnist for Washington Post Writers Group.