The slam-the-French crowd must really have its knickers in a twist over the latest from Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair: a proposal to establish a 1,500-strong force of European peacekeepers that could deploy rapidly.

I can just imagine the shock-tinged questions:

How could the Brits, who championed the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq over Paris’ protests, have let the French talk them into this concept?

Does this mean that Britain has returned to the fold of “old” Europe and no longer deserves American trust?

Should we consider adding Britain to the “adversary” list in our war of words and ideas with France?

What business do the Europeans have trying to create certain capabilities that might rival America’s?

Those kinds of questions smack of a nationalism overdose, as well as the wrong-headed notion that the Atlantic Alliance — the bulwark of Western defense during the past half-century — has little relevance today because of Iraq and other U.S.-European policy differences.

Actually, the opposite applies. In the decade preceding the flap over Iraq, many pundits proclaimed the revitalization of the alliance, which certainly needed some rethinking after its Cold War-driven reason for being evaporated. Although the pathway to purpose requires clearer definition, the proliferating crises of the 21st century — especially global terrorism — provide abundant fodder for consideration.

Healing the diplomatic scars of intervention in Iraq, though, is a necessary prerequisite. Blair, to his credit, has worked assiduously toward that goal. He has found a receptive audience in Chirac. Both understand that the future of their nations lies substantially in a cooperative relationship with the rest of Europe — economically, politically and militarily.

If anything, since the end of the Cold War, Europe has developed a more unified identity. The absence of the Soviet threat has contributed to widespread peace and stability of the sort that few would have imagined a half-century ago. Most Europeans acknowledge and appreciate the U.S. role in shaping their current good fortunes.

However, they also wish to separate themselves from the sideline status that the superpower struggle imposed. European countries, as a group, rival the United States in economic clout and seek global influence to match that reality.

What about NATO?

In certain future instances, collective action through NATO no doubt would make sense. In other cases, though, NATO might prefer not to involve itself. Yet circumstances could demand timely action by external forces.

Now, I am not advocating — nor have Blair and Chirac suggested — a military force that Europe would use simply to project influence. Rather, the specific language of their communique is that the rapid-reaction troops would respond “to a United Nations request to stabilize a situation or otherwise meet a short-term need until peacekeepers from the United Nations or regional organizations acting under a U.N. mandate could arrive or be reinforced.”

I see no danger in such bridge-building efforts within Europe. Moreover, in discussing the rapid-reaction force, Blair and Chirac also have underscored their commitment to NATO as the mainstay of European defense.

But the reaffirmation of trans-Atlantic ties cannot stop at words. Even as Europe reaches for greater independence in the security sphere, it has a vested interest in strengthening military cooperation with its traditional allies.

Dispatching a substantial European peacekeeping force to assist in stabilizing Iraq would send the proper signal. So would active engagement with the United States to clarify the Atlantic Alliance’s purpose.

Ronald D. Asmus, a senior trans-Atlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, recently wrote in Foreign Affairs about the need to rebuild the alliance. During the Cold War, he argued, NATO used a powerful military to ward off the Soviet menace, while simultaneously employing detente and engagement to push communist countries toward political transformation.

The modern age of terrorism requires a similar approach. “The new front line of defense must be trans-Atlantic homeland security. There are few areas in which the need for trans-Atlantic cooperation is more self-evident or America’s own interest in the EU’s becoming a strong and coherent actor more obvious,” Asmus wrote.

But in cobbling the pathway to purpose, the United States ought not treat Europe as a junior partner. The artificial divisions of “old” and “new” Europe also should go. And both sides must acknowledge and accept that, despite periodic disagreements, only consultation and cooperation will secure their collective future.

John C. Bersia, who won a Pulitzer Prize in editorial writing for the Orlando Sentinel in 2000, is also the special assistant to the president for global perspectives. His e-mail address is jbersia@orlandosentinel.com.