There is something surreal about the debate over whether to throw more troops at Iraq.

Clearly, U.S. forces are having trouble as instability turns more Iraqis against occupation. The next few months will test whether the White House can prevent Iraq from becoming the new Mideast magnet for al-Qaida.

But to argue over whether more military bodies will stabilize the situation misses the point.

It won’t suffice to turn the Iraq security issue into a game of numbers. Talk-show hosts ask whether we need another 300,000 soldiers in Iraq, or have plenty. Pundits ponder whether thousands of international troops, with or without U.N. blue helmets, are the answer.

Yet the heart of today’s Iraq problem is political, not military. Let me explain.

Sure, it would help to have more U.S. troops, if they were the right kind. More special forces and elite commando units, civil affairs and language specialists, more engineers — all are vitally needed. But there’s a limited supply of such resources, with key units already being diverted from Afghanistan.

As for foreign troops, sheer numbers can’t substitute for quality, either. Apart from the United States and Britain, the 29 other countries in the international coalition provide only 12,000 soldiers. They give a United Colors of Benetton look to coalition forces — but not much else.

Bulgarians, for example, are relieving U.S. Marines in the Shiite holy city of Karbala, to which they have dispatched a 455-person battalion with virtually no English speakers and only one Bulgarian-Arabic translator. The Bulgarians say they can’t take on the many local civic-affairs tasks the Marines have been performing, like training a police force.

As for countries with tougher militaries like Turkey, Pakistan, or India — which have said they might send large contingents if the White House got a stronger U.N. mandate — they could cause more problems than they solve.

Iraq’s Kurds are resistant to the idea of troops from Turkey, which has repressed Kurds at home. Iraqi Shiites are dubious about troops from Pakistan, which has failed to crush militant Sunni Islamists back home who murder Pakistani Shiites. As for India — it has brewing troubles back home with (and between) Hindu and Muslim militants.

You get the point. A broader multinational mix of peacekeepers could relieve some American units, and might be very useful once Iraq is stable. But foreign forces won’t help much in achieving that calm.

To turn Iraq around, the Bush team must give Iraqis a more visible stake in the political — and military — process.

U.S. forces are training a new Iraqi police force and army, but those new bodies won’t be ready for 18 months to two years. Iraqis can’t wait that long.

One of the biggest mistakes made by Washington was to disband the Iraqi army, wholesale. Many Iraqi officers were not strong Saddam Hussein supporters, unlike tens of thousands of special forces who were his most loyal minions. Mid-level army officers could have been found who were not tainted by high Baath party position, and who could have mustered recruits for guard duty, rebuilding tasks, and civil defense units. And for military intelligence.

This resource could still be tapped, at a rate much quicker than the retraining of wholly new forces. On a trip to Iraq in June, I met many Iraqi officers eager to serve and angry that their decision not to fight the Americans had been ignored.

There is no excuse for letting this resource go untapped.

There’s also no excuse for not taking steps to give Iraqis a clearer idea of their political future. That’s the quickest way to turn them against the bitter enders and terrorists in their midst.

What’s needed? A timetable for local and national elections, and a coalition media policy that lets Iraqis know clearly what the Americans are doing. Also a strong infusion of new U.S. aid to create jobs, and a do-whatever-it-takes attitude toward restoring electricity and water.

Give Iraqis more hope and more responsibility for their own security. That will achieve more than thousands of Indians, Bulgarians or Turks.