Washington ? Former Vice President and one-time presidential nominee Al Gore was one of only 10 Democrats to vote for the authorization of force against Iraq in 1991. He was also the only presidential nominee to have served in Vietnam. But today, he is standing in open opposition to the Bush administration’s call for force against Saddam Hussein.

His background makes his opposition credible, and therefore damaging to the call for a regime change in Iraq. As vice president, he presumably had access to the daily intelligence briefings until he left office in January 2001. Up until then he must have been kept abreast of Saddam’s ongoing efforts to build an arsenal of mass-destruction weapons, including nuclear, chemical and biological programs. He must have been aware of Iraq’s improvements in its missile program. And it will be remembered that their Scud missiles caused the most casualties during Desert Storm.

Further, ex-presidents are regularly briefed by current administrations. And though the same does not hold true for former vice presidents, it is reasonable to assume that Mr. Gore could receive intelligence information if he requests it. He has been joined in his concerns by former NATO commander Gen. Wesley K. Clark and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili and other high-ranking military officers, all of whom have had and undoubtedly continue to have access to high-level intelligence briefings.

Gore went public on Sept. 18, stating “the policy we are presently following with respect to Iraq has the potential to seriously damage our ability to win the war against terrorism and to weaken our ability to lead the world in this new century.”

Arrayed against him and his like-minded allies are the Bush administration, a large pool of active-duty officers who cannot engage in political rhetoric, and most importantly British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who has been the most articulate and credible proponent of action to oust Saddam Hussein.

How can such distinguished and intelligent individuals draw such diametrically different conclusions from the same information?

The answer is that virtually all parties in the know acknowledge the danger posed by Saddam, but differ on the timing and the response. Clearly, none of them favor the status quo, but whereas the Bush administration says there is a clear and present danger that can only be remedied by near-term action, Mr. Gore’s side is claiming that the threat is clear, but not so present. They believe there is time to invoke other actions, including diplomatic, political and economic pressure. And on the surface, their claim is rational.

The problem is that their claim lacks a fallback position. If they are wrong, and Saddam strikes, the devastation will be unimaginable. If they are wrong, and Saddam merely announces that Iraq has become a nuclear power, the Middle East balance of power will be irrevocably altered. If they are wrong, and Saddam feeds chemical and biological weapons along with financial resources to al-Qaida operatives, attacks on American cities would be a certainty.

It is the last of these that is the most likely, because unlike a nuclear attack, chemical and biological attacks funneled through terrorist operatives do not come with what the Pentagon calls “return addresses.”

On the other hand, George Bush and Tony Blair do have a fallback position. They can commence limited operations, beginning with a stepped-up air campaign, and call them off at any time.

Prediction: Gore and company may be right about the lack of immediacy in the Iraq problem. But they may be wrong, and it is a gamble we cannot and will not take.