Dealing with reality in Iraq

As former President Jimmy Carter received the Nobel Peace Prize last week, I watched with admiration. How ironic, though, that his acceptance speech mentioned how the world has taken a more dangerous and less peaceful lurch in the winter of his illustrious career.

Part of the blame falls to Saddam Hussein, who continues to bedevil the global community as he apparently toys with U.N. weapons inspectors. The Bush administration’s preliminary review finds Iraq’s recently submitted weapons report “full of holes.”

In sharp contrast to Carter’s quarter-century of selfless efforts to promote peace, Saddam has spent the same time period indulging in belligerence to satisfy his selfish aims.

My interest in Carter dates from the late 1970s, when I served in a minor federal government position in the civil-rights area. Carter’s championing of civil and human rights inspired me, as did his shepherding of the Camp David accords. The latter led me to believe a new era was dawning in the Middle East. But that was short-lived, thanks in part to Saddam.

My interest in Saddam dates to the same era. As a graduate student examining key issues in U.S. and Soviet foreign policy, my research took me to the Middle East.

Saddam was a little-known dictator in 1979, when he wrested control of Iraq from his boss, Maj. Gen. Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. In addition to taking the Iraqi people on a roller-coaster ride of human-rights horrors, Saddam made his nefarious mark by sparking two Persian Gulf wars.

And he may well prompt a third.

If that were happening as an isolated event, Americans probably wouldn’t be watching as intently and with growing concern.

The problem, though, is that conflict looms with Iraq just as the United States has its hands full fighting the war against terrorism, striving to stop the ever-worsening Israeli-Palestinian brawl and scrambling to contain trouble in far-flung places such as the Korean peninsula.

In such a busy, complicated environment, taking on another conflict would entail substantial risks. War could claim innumerable lives, inspire legions of anti-American thinkers, cost a fortune, tax the U.S. military; broaden the U.S. nation-building burden and alienate certain American allies.

Better, then, for the Bush administration to allow U.N. inspectors to do their work – no matter how frustrating that task becomes – and avoid jumping to conclusions about the weapons of mass destruction Iraq may or may not have. The truth – or the inability to produce the truth conclusively – should be apparent soon enough.

That way, if it becomes necessary to take military action against Iraq, the United States will have followed the U.N. course and will be more favorably positioned to make a plausible case to the international community.

I can’t imagine President Bush really savors another fight with Iraq, despite many signs pointing in that direction. But I believe he will proceed with one – and should – if the circumstances warrant it.

However, I would prefer to see the crisis in Iraq settled through the United Nations. An ill-considered, hasty war with Iraq could do more to serve the interests of al-Qaida and its brethren than anything else. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that a new U.S.-led war against Iraq might well top al-Qaida’s wish list.

What better way to nudge the Arab world toward solidarity against the West, given that many regional leaders no longer loathe Saddam? Or to inspire anti-American thinkers to metamorphose into terrorists and take up al-Qaida’s reported offer of $50,000 to become a suicide bomber? Or to force the unanticipated spending of hundreds of billions of dollars by the United States in a moment of economic malaise and uncertainty? Or to spread already-strained U.S. military resources dangerously thin? Or to bog the United States down in another expensive, time-consuming, long-term, nation-building endeavor? Or to exacerbate divisions between the United States and many of its traditional allies over a host of international concerns, including Iraq?

I wish the promise of Carter’s Middle East efforts had led to a different reality. Because it hasn’t, though, the United States must proceed with a clear head, well-reasoned policies and a degree of caution, lest it serve the interests of American adversaries more than its own.


– John C. Bersia, who won a Pulitzer Prize in editorial writing for the Orlando Sentinel in 2000, is also the special assistant to the president for global perspectives and a professor at the University of Central Florida. His e-mail address is jbersia@orlandosentinel.com.