Washington ? Unilateralism, bilateralism, multilateralism they are similar-sounding -isms with different meanings. The first is the go-it-alone-ism that so many people seem to fear. The second is the go-with-Britain-ism that engenders appreciation as well as assistance. And the third is the one that did little to help us win the 1991 Gulf War and much to lose the peace.

During that war, the first President Bush and his advisers were more concerned about holding a coalition together than about capitalizing on the victory over Iraq to establish a lasting peace and a friendly, democratic regime. Great Britain provided significant military support. A few other nations did somewhat less, and our Arab allies, led by Syria and Saudi Arabia, went along for the ride. In the end, it was an American show hindered by allies.

U.S. Marines were supposed to fix the Iraqi army in place while the U.S. Seventh Corps and other units stealthily moved west and struck Saddam’s forces with a left hook. But as it turned out, the Marines rolled over the Iraqi frontlines and won the race to Kuwait City, where they stopped to allow our Arab allies to march in as liberators.

It was those same Arab allies who insisted that the war not be carried on to Baghdad. They understood what the great military theoretician Karl von Clausewitz meant when he said war is politics by other means. It is a political event, not an isolated upheaval in the course of history.

This was understood by the World War II generation of American politicians and soldiers. It was an understanding that led to the Marshall Plan and NATO, which simultaneously reconstructed, revitalized and protected Europe. It was Clausewitz in action.

Now, President Bush the Younger has held a conference to discuss defense issues. And, as with virtually all things in life, thoughts begin with a philosophical basis in this instance, a debate about the purpose of military action. Is it simply there to repel an aggressor, as we did in the Gulf War, or is it there to extend a political policy, as we did in World War II?

This is the debate, and interestingly, it is being waged between the forces of Bush the Elder and Bush the Younger. The former was and remains a multilateralist. The second leans toward bilateralism. Multilateralism, by its nature, tends to water down political policy to the lowest common denominator. Bilateralism tends to assert a comprehensive political policy.

Multilateralism resulted in the status quo ante, a situation that has allowed Saddam Hussein to rebuild his forces and to continue to produce weapons of mass destruction. The bilateralism of Bush the Younger, epitomized in the call for a regime change, would use war to achieve a lasting result.

The bilateral alliance of the United States and Great Britain was able to counter their Soviet ally-of-convenience in World War II and save Western Europe. It is that same sort of lasting result that bilateralism can create in the Middle East.

The execution may be tricky, but the plan is solid:

Defeat and oust Saddam Hussein.

Install democracy in Iraq under the supervision of an American regent, just as was done with Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Japan in 1945.

Use Iraqi democracy as the base for expansion of the democratic ideal throughout the region.

Prediction: The U.S. and Britain will oust Saddam and will remain to nurture democracy in the region.