Many who believe a war on Saddam Hussein would court disaster point to an alternative way to curb him.

Send U.N. arms inspectors back to Baghdad, they say. That will check the Iraqi’s plans to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus blocked, he can’t threaten the region or U.S. interests.

If only this scenario were plausible, it would simplify the unpleasant options that Americans confront in the debate over U.S. policy on Iraq. A de-fanged Saddam minus chemical weapons, anthrax, or nukes could be contained, and wouldn’t be a regional menace. That would sharply undercut the argument for war.

But years of U.N. weapons inspections failed to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the chances of stopping the Iraqi program would be even smaller if the inspections resumed.

That means Americans must choose between a risky war to oust Saddam Hussein, or a scenario in which he may obtain a couple of nuclear weapons in the next few years. He already has used chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds, and has an active bioweapons program. Once he has nukes, it would be a far different matter to attack Baghdad.

These choices are so grim that pressure is bound to increase to try the U.N. weapons-inspection option. Saddam Hussein is now offering to discuss the return of arms inspectors who were pulled out in 1998 after Iraq totally blocked their efforts.

This is nothing but a clever Iraqi political ploy. Saddam will never willingly give up the weapons he believes are crucial to his power.

“It’s not going to happen,” says Charles Duelfer, who was deputy head of the U.N. weapons inspection mission (UNSCOM) from 1993-2000. The Security Council had required Iraq to dismantle its WMD programs after the gulf war as a condition for the lifting of economic sanctions.

But the Iraqis were determined to outwit the Security Council. Duelfer told me that Iraqi officials made clear they believed the use of chemical weapons had saved them in the Iran-Iraq war. The regime also believes possession of WMD kept George Bush from invading Baghdad in the gulf war, and that if they’d had nukes then, they would still be holding Kuwait.

“To cause Saddam to give up something vital to his survival, it ultimately won’t work.” says Duelfer.

In fact, Iraq made life a misery for hardworking UNSCOM officials in the early years of their mission. By 1995, Duelfer recalls, many Security Council members were pressuring UNSCOM to report that Iraq had fulfilled Security Council requirements. In fact, the inspectors were about to declare that the regime had partially disarmed.

Then, suddenly, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel the man in charge of his special weapons program defected to Jordan. He revealed that Iraq had hidden extensive biological and nuclear weapons programs about which the inspectors had not had a clue.

In other words, Saddam had tricked UNSCOM and run the concealment program right out of his presidential offices. Without the Kamel defection, UNSCOM might have declared Iraq both nuclear- and bioweapons-free.

Despite the Kamel revelations, Saddam continued to block the inspectors and hide his programs. And Duelfer thinks the situation would be no different if they returned now.

Already, Iraq is trying to put conditions on their return. And Duelfer believes a new inspection team will face the same run-around as did UNSCOM: Iraq will again thwart international inspectors.

Meantime, Security Council members like France and Russia, which are antsy to do business with Baghdad, will press the inspectors to declare Iraq weapons-free.

The issue, says Duelfer, “is not the inspections. It is the man himself.”

And this, indeed, is why the choices about Iraq are so difficult to make. When a malevolent ruler with a penchant for invasions is determined to get nukes and has the cash, it is very hard to stop him. Ten years of experience have shown this to be the case with Saddam Hussein.

So the question Americans face is the whether the prospect of Saddam with nukes is too risky to tolerate or not.