Iran may be U.S. ally in Mideast puzzle

? To the west is Iraq. To the east is Afghanistan. To the southeast is Pakistan. And there, smack in the center of the big trouble spots of Central Asia, is a nation that is not playing a central role in American strategic thinking.

It is, of course, Iran. For more than two decades, Washington has been spooked by Iran. The memories of the Iranian Revolution, the frustration of the hostage crisis, the heartbreak of the wreckage of the rescue team at Desert One, the rage expressed against the “Great Satan” in the streets all of these contribute to Washington’s reluctance to engage Tehran as a counterbalance in the region to Baghdad and as an insurance policy against upheaval in Islamabad.

There are, to be sure, impediments against a closer relationship with Iran. There’s little question, for example, that Iran has helped funnel arms to extremists targeting Israel. Earlier this year, President Bush grouped Iran in the “axis of evil” he said was fomenting terror across the globe. Some al-Qaida forces found sanctuary in Iran after being routed in Afghanistan. And administration officials believe Iran possesses biological weapons, which isn’t surprising considering the length of its western border with Iraq and the traditional enmity between the two nations.

Even so, Iran may yet emerge as a vital piece of any broad American regional approach to the difficult problems of Central Asia.

“You can’t deal with all these issues unless you take Iran into account,” says John D. Stempel, director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky and a former acting political counselor in the American embassy during the Iranian Revolution. “It’s hard to do because there is a generation of Americans who look at Iran and see evil and see no subtleties. But we have to engage here.”

The politics are complex; the country is composed of several different Irans, one deeply conservative and skeptical, another open and cosmopolitan; one tending toward religious orthodoxy, another tending toward industrial entrepreneurship. But in an unusual and little-noticed “special contribution” to a United Nations Development Program report released this month, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami wrote eloquently about human freedoms and democracy. “The world’s future,” he said, “belongs to democracy at all levels of governance, advancing ethical, legal and political values based on dialogue and the free exchange of ideas and cultures.”

The Khatami statement was prepared before, but not released until after, the Bush administration decided it would no longer work with the Iranian president and would more profitably support independent elements within Iran. Even so, the Khatami statement combined with the restiveness inside Iran indicates a strong impulse toward democracy within the nation. And together they underline the American opportunity in a land that was once a symbol of Islamic contempt for the United States.

Indeed, it is now clear that the United States and Iran share many common national interests.

One, of course, is the flow of oil. Iran once was a major supplier of oil to the United States. In recent decades it has been bypassed by pipelines, leaving Iranian energy officials eager to find ways to transport oil west. Iran’s energy resources, moreover, play into the strategic part that Iran wants, not only in the region but in the world: It hungers to be taken seriously.

Iran can play a vital role in the region, in part because no one else can. Iraq under Saddam Hussein has developed weapons of mass destruction. Afghanistan today is inherently unstable. Pakistan is riddled with domestic problems and has a dangerous nuclear-tipped rivalry with India. The irony of the age is that Iran could be the major force for stability in the region.

This comes at a time when Iran is looking for the approbation of the West. Iran has a long history of relationships with Great Britain and the United States, even if the two nations are remembered principally for their domination. In its national psyche, Iran looks west, much the way the Russia of Peter the Great did in the 18th century. At the same time, however, Iran demands recognition of its culture and prominence. Unlike others in the region, Khatami doesn’t see a clash of civilizations. He sees the possibility of civilizations working together in harmony.

The president, other democratic-leaning elements in Iran and even some in the Iranian clerical establishment lean strongly toward modernization. They believe that economic growth is the answer to Iran’s problems, and they know that growth today cannot come without technology. That’s another potential American opening.

Richard Nixon is seldom cited in Washington today, but the old cold warrior sometimes understood the value of ignoring ideology and seizing on opportunity. In his day, he centered much of his Middle Eastern policy on Iran. He believed Iran was a powerful player and here is a grand chestnut of a phrase an important island of stability. This is a different world there is no shah, for example, and radical clerics play an important role in Iran but the point still stands and the opportunity is still there.