President Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s declaration of a state of emergency in Pakistan, backed by military muscle, could ignite a wildfire of discontent and instability that sends him scurrying from power, some critics contend. Others cheer the weekend’s strong-arm move as overdue and decisive, in fact, the proper prescription for an epidemic of Islamic extremism.

Of course, both cannot be right.

I side with those who worry about the many negatives associated with Pakistan’s clamping down on civil liberties.

Such behavior insults a welcome trend toward the expansion of democracy and pluralism in the Asia-Pacific region. One does not protect a system based on constitutional rights by flouting those same guarantees.

Moreover, Musharraf had made a mockery of them by suggesting that he would restore democracy after parliamentary elections, which had been anticipated for early next year. How can Pakistan possibly hold a free and fair election in the midst of repression and uncertainty?

Thus, the United States and other countries have every reason to shake their heads over Musharraf’s moves and urge a return to normalcy.

If he heeds those calls and strives to deal with the extremists within a proper democratic context, fine. If not, what could lie ahead?

Trouble – lots of it.

Musharraf may well believe that his authoritarian ways will suppress his adversaries and dampen the appeal of their radical teachings. But the opposite could just as easily materialize.

In fact, if opponents perceive Musharraf’s bid for greater control as a sign of weakness or sense that the end of his regime is closer than they had imagined, they might be inspired to redouble their efforts.

A dictatorship – which is essentially where Pakistan’s government is headed on its current track – also would help Islamic extremists whip up support. It would not surprise me to see Musharraf critics take to the streets in numbers that dwarf past protests. In that regard, I agree with one of Pakistan’s former prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto, who said, “The extremists need a dictatorship, and dictatorship needs extremists.”

In addition, Bhutto herself has been placed in a more complicated situation. After her recent return to Pakistan, hopes were high that her influence and prestige might be linked to Musharraf in a constructive alliance. She already had her share of detractors, some of whom tried to kill her in a suicide attack last month. Unless and until Musharraf changes course, she has little incentive to work with him.

Should Musharraf fall, two terrifying threats – beyond the unraveling of Pakistan and ensuing regional disruption – would emerge.

First, it would greatly complicate the task of prevailing over groups such as al-Qaida that use Pakistan as a hideout and launching point for attacks in neighboring Afghanistan. Ditto for the search to find Osama bin Laden.

But a setback in the war against terrorism would pale in comparison to the second threat – the potential spread of nuclear weapons from Pakistan’s arsenal into unfriendly hands. If those hands happened to belong to terrorists, the nightmare of an attack using the worst weapon of mass destruction would advance one step closer to reality.

Musharraf would stand a better chance of stabilizing Pakistan by restoring democracy, forging a stronger coalition with internal moderates, deepening ties to friendly countries, and exposing the hypocrisy and shortcomings of extremists in the transparency of public discussion.