Washington ? After lengthy meetings with Iraq insiders here, my thinking about the crisis in that country has come full circle: It is time to close out this tragic, deadly affair, and plan an orderly drawdown of American and allied troops.

As those who have followed this column with regularity already know, I opposed the 2003 U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, warning that it would lead to a quagmire costing innumerable lives and billions of dollars, as well as a long, troublesome occupation. I specifically rejected the overly optimistic view, that of a quick victory and a speedy embrace of democracy by Iraqis. I also dismissed the overly pessimistic perspective, that of a “Mesopotamian Stalingrad,” in which former dictator Saddam Hussein would use whatever weapons of mass destruction that he supposedly possessed to wreak havoc.

After the intervention took place, with the unintended but not surprising consequence of creating a massive new front in the war against terrorism, I believed that it was important to give the Bush administration some time. Surely, I thought, the White House had crafted a clear, comprehensive, measurable strategy for the aftermath, just as it apparently had for the combat phase.

When such plans failed to materialize, I opted to stay the course and stand by U.S. troops – largely because the chaotic alternative was too horrible to consider – with an essential caveat: that sufficient forces be provided to lock down Iraq and finish the job. I urged the dispatching of more troops for one and only one reason: to boost the chances of stabilizing Iraq and hasten the return of our young men and women. It did not happen.

As I waited for President George W. Bush to unveil his much-anticipated “new” strategy after the 2006 elections, I arrived at a different conclusion: Should he not produce robust and creative initiatives to ensure a decisive victory, then Bush essentially would embark on another pointless twist in a faltering venture. In that event, the United States might as well accept defeat sooner rather than later, and begin a withdrawal of its troops.

Unfortunately, that is where things stand this week, as congressional leaders prepare to mount a strong challenge to Bush’s so-called troop surge. In truth, his feeble plan will not lead Iraq toward peace and security; it will merely provide more targets for American adversaries.

Thus, the most rational option at this stage is to identify a reasonable exit strategy and work assiduously toward it.

At least a promising way out beckons. If it is pursued, the eventual withdrawal of foreign troops and the redeployment of others (realistically, some foreign troops will be required to help Iraq for a number of years) will not leave a vacuum in which only civil war and terrorism can thrive.

The potential solution has fluttered around the contentious debate over Iraq at each misdirected, ineffective turn that the Bush administration has taken. It is evident on the streets of Baghdad every day, as Iraqis allow their feet to talk for them, moving from disrupted residential areas, where Shia and Sunnis often lived side by side, to the relative security of their own sects. For all practical purposes, they now live apart from one another.

Those circumstances practically beg for the next step: the partition of Iraq into largely autonomous regions for the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish groups, with a loose central government acting as an umbrella. Many specialists believe that merely announcing such a plan would ease tensions, particularly in and around Baghdad. That situation would allow the bulk of foreign troops to leave over the next year or so. Remaining ones could then redeploy to other parts of Iraq for duties such as peacekeeping and fighting foreign insurgents.

The defining moment in the Iraq crisis – America’s single most important issue – has arrived. If Congress allows the president to plunge on with another half-baked plan, the hemorrhaging in Iraq will continue without end. But if lawmakers work together to encourage a restructured Iraq of largely autonomous regions, they would give Iraqis reason to hope and help salvage a U.S. foreign-policy disaster of growing proportions.