Damascus, Syria ? Anwar al-Bunni works in a low-ceilinged, wood-paneled apartment office, in a middle-class district of the Syrian capital, trying to free political prisoners. He’s been doing it for years, during which his brothers, sister, brother-in law, and sister-in-law served a cumulative 60 years in prison for opposing the Baath party regime.

For most of that time the rest of the world ignored him. But since President Bush’s democracy campaign, Damascus’ small, brave group of human-rights advocates and lawyers, former political prisoners, and opposition intellectuals, have become hot media items. They are sought out by U.S. and European visitors, and Arab and Western press, almost like a packaged Arab democracy tour.

They deserve the attention, but as Bunni is the first to tell you, they don’t add up to any kind of an organized opposition. They are small in number, their open supporters are few, and demonstrations are extremely rare. Organized Islamist opposition groups are banned.

“For decades we have had no political life,” Bunni says. “All civil society and political movements have been killed.” He is describing a country where the Assad family has ruled for 35 years.

If the Baath party regime of Bashar Assad collapsed suddenly, there would be nothing to replace it. No movement, no party, no likely leaders, certainly no liberal democrats in the wings. Every single opposition intellectual I spoke to predicted chaos.

Many feared the biggest beneficiaries would be the adherents of hard-line Islam.

This is the Syrian reality. But it’s not clear this reality is fully grasped by the Bush administration. Official U.S. policy is to isolate Syria and press it to change behavior toward Iraq, Lebanon and Israel, but it’s clear that some senior U.S. officials want regime change.

There seems to be little interest in Washington in the survival of the Assad regime, even for a few years, during which the weak opposition might gain experience and traction. After Assad, the deluge; let the Syrians pick up the pieces. Sound familiar?

The new catchphrase in Washington for Mideast chaos is constructive instability – out of which democracy will supposedly bloom. But does the administration know any more about Syria’s religious and ethnic complexities than it did about Iraq’s?

Syria is a country where power is held by the minority Alawites – an offshoot of Shia Islam – who are despised by the majority Sunnis. Officially, the country is the most secular of any Arab nation. Young women can be seen at Damascus nightclubs in midriff-baring blouses and tight Capri pants.

But strict Islamic practice is on the rise. Visit poor Damascus neighborhoods, and you will see every woman wearing a long, enveloping coat, called a manteau, and a head scarf. In the ancient city of Aleppo, women drift through its maze of covered markets and alleys in full black robes with their faces fully or partly covered by black veils.

Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi says people have turned in growing numbers to the mosque because of the lack of freedom. Other ideologies such as communism or Arab nationalism have failed, so Islam seems the only answer. (Liberalism still has little appeal here.) Many Syrians take jobs in Saudi Arabia for better pay and come home converted to the hard-line Wahabi stream of Islam.

“In my home village,” says Hamidi, “at least 20 teachers taught in Saudi Arabia, and you can see the difference in their thinking.”

The satellite dishes that cover every Damascus roof, and the Internet cafes that have emerged in the past five years, spread all kinds of new ideas – from liberal to pornographic to Islamic. A bookstore across from the Russian Cultural Center that once sold Marxist tracts now displays a window full of digitalized Korans from palm-held size to wide computer screen.

So even though Syria is a tolerant society, and even though the Muslim Brotherhood is banned, a sudden regime collapse could produce a surge of Islamic groups trying to take power. Many worry about a Sunni burst of vengeance against the despised Alawite minority that now rules. Members of Syria’s many Christian churches worry that fundamentalists will threaten them. And every Syrian Arab, even the handful of liberals, worries that the Syrian Kurds will try to emulate their Iraqi cousins and secede in all but name.

A sudden collapse of the Assad regime could tear Syria’s complex social fabric apart, unless it occurs after a transition that allows Syria’s tiny opposition to develop. That regime will collapse soon enough, unless it reforms. But does America want to push Syria toward reform or toward the chaotic Iraqi model?

Every Syrian intellectual I met asked me that question. I had no good answer.