I got an e-mail at 3:05 a.m. Thursday from my Iraqi translator in Baghdad. He was distraught. Here’s what he wrote:

“Dear Trudy, How r u, I hope u r fine. I’m sorry to bother u, but I don’t feel well since yesterday, actually I think I’m still in shock.

“Definitely you’ve seen footage or photos of what happened in Fallujah. My bad luck took me there yesterday. I reached Fallujah 20 minutes after the accident and heard about it. We weren’t (reporting) breaking news, but needed to cross the river, so I told my driver to take a detour and cross from the old steel bridge.

“As we reached the neck of the bridge I was utterly shocked to see 2 dark brown burnt bodies tied with ropes to both sides of the bridge just 3 feet away from me. The scene was undescribable and no human could have done this. I can’t till now express my feelings at that moment. It takes a crooked mind to justify killing others, but what by the name of God can imagine any body doing that? I wanted to throw up. Sorry to disturb you, but I want to get it out of my chest and talk to a friend. Shamil.”

This e-mail was a welcome reminder that most Iraqis don’t endorse the barbarity on view in Fallujah. The town is a violent place, where most men worked for Saddam Hussein’s military and intelligence, and many now listen to fanatical Sunni preachers. It isn’t hard to whip up a mob there. As Shamil put it: “There is something different in their mentality.”

The U.S. military has never had a consistent policy for Fallujah. Five military units have tried either carrots or sticks. The Marines who took over March 24 will have to use both, in bigger doses, lest the place turn into a little Gaza Strip.

But Fallujah is part of a much bigger problem. The United States plans to turn over sovereignty to Iraqis on June 30. Yet occupation officials — who shortsightedly disbanded Iraq’s army in May — have trained no Iraqi security force capable of fighting insurgents. That means the burden of fighting those insurgents — in Fallujah and elsewhere — will fall on U.S. troops for a long time to come.

The United States can’t just pull out of Iraq. That would guarantee the resurgence of Hussein’s Baathists and strengthen radical Iraqi Islamists. Ideally, however, more security responsibilities should be handed over to Iraqi security forces by June 30.

U.S. forces have indeed been pulling back from the cities. But U.S. officials seem unable or unwilling to create Iraqi security forces that can protect those cities. The new Iraqi police, who were supposed to be Iraq’s main security bulwark, lack training and equipment. It’s little wonder that they didn’t show up to chase away the mob in Fallujah; the local police station was shot up a month ago, and 15 officers were killed.

Maj. Gen. Charles Swannack Jr., commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, which just left Fallujah, complained publicly about the shortage of vehicles, radios and body armor for Iraqi security forces, including police and the new Civil Defense Corps. Why should we be surprised when U.S. reservists were until recently being sent into danger without Kevlar vests or armored Humvees?

The Pentagon awarded a $327 million contract to supply this equipment — but only in January, seven months after disbanding the Iraqi army. The contract was let to a small U.S. company, Nour USA, which had no experience in supplying weapons but had the advantage of being run by a friend of the Pentagon’s favorite Iraqi, Ahmed Chalabi. However, the contract has just been canceled because serious questions were raised about the way the procurement process was handled. This means additional months of delays.

Some U.S. commanders have used discretionary funds to buy secondhand equipment for Iraqi forces in their regions without going through Pentagon procurement. One senior U.S. military commander told me he could get the equipment more cheaply and quickly that way. But commanders don’t have millions to spare.

Even if Iraqi forces were sufficiently equipped, they are not organized to defeat an insurgency. The Civil Defense Corps has been trained to help U.S. forces, not stand alone as a tough gendarmerie. Only three battalions of the new Iraqi army — about 2,100 men — were trained in a year.

With no Iraqi force ready to do the job, U.S. troops are left with the responsibility of fighting insurgents for the foreseeable future. Few other countries are likely to send troops, even under a new U.N. resolution. Once Iraqis regain sovereignty on June 30, U.S. troops may have less leeway to operate as they like, even as the insurgents are turning up the heat.

The events in Fallujah should shock the Pentagon into revising its strategy for setting up Iraqi forces — in consultation with Iraqis. There is no time to lose.