Washington ? Columbia accident investigators say their final report will contain few surprises when it is issued today, concluding that foam debris caused the Feb. 1 tragedy and that NASA’s management structure played a role in the miscalculations leading up to the tragedy.

But the report by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board is still likely to contain recommendations that could shake up the nation’s human space flight program and employ uncharacteristically tough language critical of the space agency.

“It’s been advertised as hard-hitting, and I think it will match the advertisement,” John M. Logsdon, an accident board member, said in an interview Monday. “We won’t pull any punches.”

The report is likely to address many shuttle problems, pushing the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to speed up replacement of the aged shuttle fleet, to increase inspections by quality controllers and to pay closer attention to its own engineers who have safety concerns.

But the report will sidestep some contentious issues, such as providing a crew ejection system for astronauts. The board probably will not call upon NASA to redesign the shuttle’s external tank to ensure that foam does not fall off. And it is not likely to cast harsh criticism on Congress for failing to adequately fund the space program, critics say.

“If one could fault NASA, it would be for willing to do more with less,” said Richard Blomberg, the former chairman of NASA’s independent safety advisory board. “Everybody is jumping to judgment too quickly. I looked at NASA’s culture for 15 years, and it is the most safety-conscious organization I have ever seen.”

Although the investigation board has issued five preliminary recommendations on technical issues so far, board chairman Harold Gehman Jr. has given few hints about other recommendations.

“There will be a fairly long list of recommendations, some of which are related to return to flight,” Logsdon said. “We’ll say some things of what the nation should do about replacing the shuttle.

“It really focuses on the shuttle program,” he added. “We don’t say anything about the value of human space flight, or whether the space station should exist. We look at the physical and organizational causes of the shuttle accident and what to do to prevent it from happening. Ninety-five percent of the report is about the shuttle.”

But Charles Vick, a senior space analyst for GlobalSecurity.org, voiced deep skepticism about the report, saying that the recommendations were likely to “fall short of what really needs to be done” and that many of the recommendations were likely to hit significant resistance from Congress and the White House.

“This administration doesn’t have the funding available to do everything that is needed. Nobody is willing to pay to get the job done,” Vick said.

Don Nelson, a retired NASA engineer, criticized the board for failing to recommend a crew escape system.

“How in the world they could not have investigated the crew escape issue from the beginning is beyond all reasonable logic,” Nelson said. “I believe this board may now be as guilty as the NASA management.”

But others remained more positive about what the report can accomplish.

“The board has been very comprehensive and very diligent,” said Allen Li, a NASA expert at the General Accounting Office. “So, I am optimistic about them being able to bring some light to the whole issue.”